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Richard Richards, Robert Roberts, and Aristotelian 
Aristotelianism 
Steve Gimbel 
 
 This paper is a tribute to a philosopher and 
a person I have long admired, Richard C. Richards.  
As a clear and rigorous thinker, a thoughtful and 
accessible writer, and as a kind, blunt, and extremely 
funny person, Richard embodies virtues I hope to 
someday claim as well.   
 It is, I believe, fitting, to begin this tribute to 
Richard by considering the philosophical work of 
someone else entirely.  Richard has a well-developed 
sense of humor, something he defines as the 
attitude to properly appreciate incongruities, and 
the idea of honoring one person by discussing the 
work of another is surely the sort of incongruity he 
has the attitude to appreciate. 
 The other philosopher I want to begin 
discussing in order to honor Richard C. Richards is 
another prominent name in the philosophy of 
humor, Robert C. Roberts.  Roberts is emeritus from 
Wheaton College, that is, the Wheaton College in 
Illinois, not the Wheaton College in Massachusetts.  
(I want to be perfectly clear that we are talking 
about Robert Roberts from Wheaton, not Robert 
Roberts from Wheaton.)  Richard Richards and 
Robert Roberts, we will see, are similar in that the 
72 
 
accounts of humor they give come from a 
commitment to an Aristotelian foundation.    
Robert Roberts is quite explicit about this in 
his article “Humor and the Virtues.”  In this piece, 
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, begins by 
adopting an incongruity account of humor.  For both 
Robert Roberts and Richard Richards, an act is 
humorous only if it includes an incongruity that is at 
least perceived by the person finding the act 
humorous (more than perception may be required, 
but the perception of the incongruity is at least a 
necessary condition for an act to be an act of 
humor). 
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, is not 
interested in humor theory for the sake of humor 
theory, but hopes to find how we ought to think 
about humor as embedded in the lived life.   
The key to perceiving incongruities for the 
sake of humor, according to Robert Roberts, is 
“perspectivity.”  When we see something as 
incongruous, what we are often doing is seeing the 
same thing from multiple perspectives.  By seeing 
the same thing through different interpretive lenses, 
we can make sense of the same thing in different, 
perhaps contrasting, ways.   
This perspectivity, he argues, requires 
dissociation, that is, (a) the ability for us to recognize 
that there is a perspective other than our own to be 
occupied, and (b) the ability to then occupy this 
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alternative perspective.  To develop a sense of 
humor, that is, to be able to recognize humor, one 
needs to always be aware that one is perceiving 
through a perspective which is not the only possible 
perspective.   
He does not, however, contend that all is 
mere perspective.  He is committed to the existence 
of an objective reality.  So, we must not attribute to 
Robert Roberts a perspectival perspectivalism, but 
rather a more limited perspectivalism which he 
terms “soft perspectivalism.”  There is a real world, 
he holds, but we experience it from one of many 
possible angles. 
Humor is to found in simultaneously 
understanding: (1) the perception of the object of 
the perception from our perspective, (2) that there is 
another perspective from which the object of 
perception may be perceived, (3) the perception of 
the object of perception from the alternative 
perspective, and (4) that there is an incongruity 
between the two perceptions despite the fact that 
they are perceptions of the same object being 
perceived.  Sometimes, but only sometimes, this 
incongruity will be of the proper sort to be 
humorous.  A sense of humor is the ability to 
distinguish the proper from the improper cases. 
The question he ultimately seeks to answer 
in setting this out is whether a sense of humor ought 
to be considered a virtue, or at least something 
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capable of enhancing one’s moral education which 
he works out in terms of character development 
which in turn is worked out in terms of virtues.  This 
is where the Aristotelianism is fully transparent. 
This gets ramped up further with Robert 
Roberts’ contention that each person possesses both 
a character and a nature and that virtue is the state 
of one’s character being brought into line with one’s 
nature.  To recognize that there is a gap between 
one’s character and one’s nature is to see oneself in 
two different ways as being two different things.  
This is an incongruity and can, through proper 
dissociation and perspectivity, allow one to laugh at 
one’s own flaws and foibles.  This, then, puts us in a 
place of objective knowledge about what we need to 
improve in ourselves and that is crucial to personal 
growth.  In Robert Roberts’ own words, 
 
“The concept of a virtue implies the concept 
of a human nature.  To possess a virtue is to 
be ‘qualified’ as having to that extent 
realized one’s nature, as having become in 
actuality what one inevitably was in 
potentiality.  The concept of a virtue is thus 
the concept of a congruity between one’s 
character and one’s nature, and thus of the 
live possibility of lacking congruity between 
character and nature – of falling short of 
one’s telos.  Given this, the form of humor 
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closely connected with the virtues would be 
a representation of moral failures as 
incongruities.  To perceive such 
incongruities in oneself and others would 
be a mark of moral knowledge, and the 
disposition to perceive them could be 
counted as an important part of wisdom.  In 
so far as wisdom is a virtue which pervades 
the others – there being wisdom concerning 
justice, wisdom concerning truth-telling, 
wisdom about situations calling for courage, 
etc. – the moral sense of humor would 
perhaps apply, with differences, to the 
whole range of virtues (Roberts, p. 130).” 
 
We see in Robert Roberts’ writing that a sense of 
humor may be an aid to becoming a more virtuous 
person, in other words, an aid in our moral 
education. 
 Let us now turn from Robert Roberts to 
Richard Richards.  Richard Richards, like Robert 
Roberts, contends that we possess a character and, 
like Aristotle, holds character to be comprised of 
attitudes and proclivities that we develop through 
our choices and our actions.  Like Robert Roberts, 
Richard Richards is committed to a real reality and 
among that which may be considered objective is 
humor.  It is an objective fact of the world if 
something is humorous and those with a developed 
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sense of humor will be the accomplished judges that 
we can turn to in order to see whether an act was, in 
fact, humorous. 
 So, what is it to have a sense of humor 
according to Richard?  In his words, 
 
“A sense of humor is an attitude or set of 
attitudes that involve a tendency to notice, 
explore, and sometimes create 
incongruities, and to appreciate them in a 
playful way that is usually pleasurable 
(Richards, p. 72).” 
 
A sense of humor is thus, first and foremost, an 
attitude or set of attitudes.   What is an attitude? 
 
“An attitude is a habitual psychological 
structure that influences and often controls 
what we perceive, that is, what we think 
and feel, and the beliefs we have about 
those things we perceive and feel.  Though 
the term ‘attitude’ has, in common usage, 
come to mean mostly a bad or hostile 
attitude, I am using the term much more 
generally.  Roughly, an attitude is a set of 
habits with which we approach life, and 
many attitudes are learned early in life 
(Richards, pp. 72-3).” 
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As with Robert Roberts, we see with Richard 
Richards, a firm commitment to a practical 
Aristotelianism. 
 A sense of humor for Richard is thus an 
attitude.  It is an attitude which leads to the 
appreciation of incongruities.  Let us take the notion 
of incongruity to be well-understood and well-
defined (ignoring Robert Latta’s objections here).  
The question remaining is therefore, “What is it to 
appreciate an incongruity?”  Richard answers, 
 
“The act of appreciating involves 
recognizing the worth of something.  It 
involves the discovery or creation of value.  
You have to have some sort of knowledge in 
order to appreciate something. That also 
distinguishes it from simple cases of liking.  
You can like something without recognizing 
its worth or value.  You can value something 
without liking it.  The recognition of value or 
worth involves the possession of some kind 
of knowledge other than that involved in 
liking (Richards, p. 76).” 
 
Appreciating something, an incongruity or 
otherwise, involves specialized knowledge which 
some may possess and others not.  In this way, we 
see John Stuart Mill’s famous passage from 
Utilitarianism being obliquely referred to in which 
78 
 
there are some who have developed a proclivity that 
makes them superior judges of value.  “It is better to 
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different 
opinion, it is only because they only know their own 
side of the question. (Mill, p. 10).”  In the same way, 
if a person with a developed sense of humor finds 
something funny and someone else does not, the 
person without the developed sense of humor is 
wrong about the objective fact of the humorousness 
of the object. 
 The sense of humor as Richard Richards sets 
it out does not require an objective human nature.  
It is a desirable development in the character of a 
person, but not a failure of character the way Robert 
Roberts would have.  As such, what we see in 
Richard Richards’ conception of the human and the 
sense of humor is something akin to Kant’s notion of 
an imperfect duty.  It is a good to develop it, but not 
something morally necessary. 
 But its development is not direct.  
According to Richard, the development of a sense of 
humor requires first that one develop a sense of the 
funny.   
 
“The sense of the funny is a skill at 
determining where a person is likely to find 
the amusing, rather than simply waiting for 
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something to happen which causes laughs.  
It also includes a habitual understanding of 
when it is appropriate to laugh and when it 
is not (Richards, p. 77).” 
 
As a child, one develops a sense of the funny, but 
then as an adult one may go farther and develop a 
full-fledged sense of humor. 
 
“When does the sense of the funny become 
the sense of humor?  It varies in individual 
cases.  We hone the ability to laugh at the 
proper times.  From this proceeds the 
ability to appreciate the incongruities of life.  
It takes more learning for a person to have 
a sense of humor than to learn to laugh 
when others laugh, to laugh when someone 
says something that is called ‘funny’ and we 
feel obliged to laugh (Richards, p. 78).” 
 
So, where Robert Roberts gives us an account of the 
sense of humor that comes not only from a 
commitment to a virtue ethics, but also a 
commitment to the underlying metaphysical picture 
of the human being, we can say that Robert Roberts 
has an Aristotelian Aristotelianism.  Richard 
Richards, unlike Robert Roberts, does not have an 
Aristotelian Aristotelianism.  Richard Richards’ 
Aristotelianism is more intricate.  He invokes the sort 
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of levels of knowledge being morally relevant that 
we find in Mill.  He makes the sense of humor a 
desirable property along the lines of the imperfect 
duties of Kant.  And he makes the development of it 
a stepwise evolutionary process of the sort we find 
in Hegel.  Therefore, we can say that Richard has a 
Kantian Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism.   
 I love the phrase “Kantian Hegelian Millian 
Aristotelianism” because it might be a convoluted 
way of saying something straightforward which 
would make it quite Kantian.  It might be a 
convoluted way of saying absolutely nothing, which 
would make it quite Hegelian.  Or it might just lead 
one to have a nervous breakdown which would 
make it quite Millian. 
 I will mention the title of one of my favorite 
papers in the philosophy of language at this point by 
Nathan Salmon.  His goal in this article is to revive 
John Stuart Mill’s approach to language and is titled, 
“How to be a Millian Heir.”  I do not bring this up 
because it has any relevance at all to the points I am 
making here, but rather because this is my paper 
and I will talk about whatever the fuck I want. 
 So, we have with Robert Roberts and 
Richard Richards, two contrasting Aristotelian 
accounts of the sense of humor.  Robert Roberts is 
an Aristotelian Aristotelian where Richard Richards is 
not an Aristotelian Aristotelian, but rather a Kantian 
Hegelian Millian Aristotelian.   
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 Which of the two ought we prefer?  To 
weigh the two alternatives with an eye toward 
seeing which is stronger, I propose we look to 
Richard Richards.  Not Richard Richards – that would 
be to engage in circular reasoning precisely because 
the reasoning would be circular.  Rather, Richard 
Richards, by which I mean not Richard C. Richards, 
the beloved member of the Lighthearted 
Philosophers Society and emeritus philosopher of 
aesthetics, ethics, and love and sex from Cal Poly, 
Pomona, but rather Richard A. Richards, professor of 
philosophy with a focus on the philosophy of biology 
at the University of Alabama.  (That’s the University 
of Alabama not in Birmingham, but in Tuscaloosa, 
real Alabama – Richard Richards from Alabama 
Alabama).  Richard A. Richards toured the world as a 
professional, classical dancer before he became a 
professional philosopher, completing his graduate 
work at Johns Hopkins where we took graduate 
seminars in philosophy of science together.  I pride 
myself on perhaps being the only person who is 
friends with both Richard Richardses. 
 As one would expect from an expert on 
evolutionary explanation, Richard Richards gives an 
account of aesthetic judgment which is modeled 
upon the Darwinian concept of fitness.  Evolutionary 
fitness, Richards argues, is a three-place relationship 
among the property, the organism, and the context 
in which the organism finds itself.  It is the 
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contextual piece that is essential here.  No property 
is itself good for an organism in general, but only 
good in terms of its context.  That context may be 
internal – that is, advantageous in terms of the 
relations of the parts of the organisms – or external 
– that is, advantageous in relation to some 
environmental factor.  But whether it is an internal 
or external context, we have to see fitness as a 
function of its functional context.  Fitness for Richard 
Richards is a function of function. 
 Richard Richards’ own fitness, for example, 
has been significantly aided by the contextual factor 
of his avoiding gluten.  He told me he dropped 
fifteen pounds.  Dude looked good last time I was 
down in Alabama. 
 Just as with evolutionary fitness, so too with 
artistic fitness. We have to see fitness as a three-
place relation connecting a property of the work 
(e.g., unity, complexity, or intensity), the work as a 
whole, and the context of the work.  Again, the 
functional context may be internal – that is, a 
function of the property understood fully within the 
work itself, such as color relationships, composition, 
or form – or it may be external – that is, an aspect of 
the social, historical, or political context in which the 
artistic work is appreciated. 
 As a philosopher with a strong biological 
background, he points out that a number of the 
properties we judge positively in works of art are 
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direct results of our cognitive structure which 
directly results from our brains being the product of 
evolutionary processes.  The human brain, for 
example, is outstanding at edge detection because 
we naturally engage in lateral inhibition wherein the 
brain naturally exaggerates the contrast in light 
values when darker and lighter areas are juxtaposed.  
This is why we will naturally project boundaries and 
edges onto pieces like pointillist works in which none 
exist. 
 As such, our appreciation of art – and we 
can argue by extension, humor – is a function of our 
function as humans.  This is very much in line with 
the sort of Aristotelian Aristotelianism of Robert 
Roberts as it posits universal human properties 
which we can see as the sort of human nature 
Roberts requires. 
 But Richard Richards also contends that the 
external context is crucial to understanding our 
understanding of art.  We acquire categories 
through education and the more educated one is, 
the better one is as a judge of artistic quality.   
 
“The experience of an artwork will 
therefore vary depending on which features 
we believe to be standard, variable, and 
contra-standard, and that depends on 
experience and learning.  Consequently, 
functional context – and functioning – will 
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vary depending on the presence of this kind 
of knowledge in those who experience the 
work (Richards, p. 267).” 
 
Further, the acquired knowledge affects how we 
perceive, not just how we interpret what we 
perceive. 
 
“Education can affect the experience of an 
artwork in other ways.  Experiments have 
shown that formal training influences visual 
scan paths in the scrutiny of the artwork 
(ibid.).” 
 
If we take humor to be an artistic category, then this 
approach is precisely in line with the sort of Kantian 
Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism espoused by Richard 
Richards. 
 So, while Richard Richards may be seen at 
first to side with Robert Roberts against Richard 
Richards, in the end it does seem that Richard 
Richards supports Richard Richards over Robert 
Roberts.  But he does not fully locate himself on 
either extreme, instead contending that the correct 
answer is to be found in the mean between two 
extremes.  So, while Richard Richards may not 
espouse an Aristotelian Aristotelianism; Richard 
Richards, on the other hand, can be thought of as 
adopting an Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism.  
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But Richard Richards’ Aristotelian Aristotelian 
Aristotelianism does not support Robert Roberts’ 
Aristotelian Aristotelianism, rather Richard Richards’ 
Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism supports 
Richard Richards’ Kantian Hegelian Millian 
Aristotelianism.  So, we must conclude that in this 
case, we should agree with Richard.  That is, Richard, 
not Richard.  But we agree with Richard because 
Richard agrees with Richard. 
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